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Abstract
We analyze selected iterated conditionals in the framework of conditional random quantities. We
point out that it is instructive to examine Lewis’s triviality result, which shows the conditions
a conditional must satisfy for its probability to be the conditional probability. In our approach,
however, we avoid triviality because the import-export principle is invalid. We then analyze an
example of reasoning under partial knowledge where, given a conditional if A then C as informa-
tion, the probability of A should intuitively increase. In our approach, we explain this intuition by
making some implicit background information explicit. We consider several (generalized) iterated
conditionals, which allow us to formalize different kinds of latent information. We verify that for
these iterated conditionals the prevision is greater than or equal to the probability of A. We also
investigate the lower and upper bounds of the Affirmation of the Consequent inference. We con-
clude our study with some remarks on the supposed “independence” of two conditionals, and we
interpret this property as uncorrelation between two random quantities.
Keywords: Coherence, Conditional random quantities, Conditional probabilities and previsions,
Conjoined and iterated conditionals, Affirmation of the Consequent, Independence and
uncorrelation.
1. Introduction and motivation
“Even the crows on the roofs caw about the nature of conditonals”
(Callimachos quoted after [58], p. 128)
Debates about the nature of conditionals have a very long tradition in philosophy and logic, which
go back at least to Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo ([58]). Even at that early stage, the
emerging debate inspired the famous Callimachos epigram. The logical tradition in the study of
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conditionals has recently led to the popularity of probabilistic approaches. Among the various
interpretations of probability (see, e.g., [32]), we adopt the subjective analysis, which is due to
de Finetti ([22, 23]) and Ramsey ([84]). The probabilistic theory of de Finetti, based on the
well-known coherence principle, has been studied and extended by many authors (see, e.g., [3,
4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 19, 20, 34, 37, 38, 41, 46, 47, 59, 71, 72]). We recall that the coherence
principle of de Finetti plays a key role in probabilistic reasoning. Indeed, it allows us to extend
any coherent assessment, on an arbitrary family of (conditional) events, to further (conditional)
events (fundamental theorem of probability). De Finetti and Ramsey have held that the probability
of a natural language conditional, Ppif A then Cq, and the conditional subjective probability of C
given A, PpC|Aq, are closely related to each other ([6]). Identifying these probabilities has such
far-reaching consequences that it has simply been called the Equation ([29]), but we will refer to
it here as the conditional probability hypothesis:
(CPH) Ppif A then Cq “ PpC|Aq.
A conditional that satisfies the CPH has been termed a conditional event ([23]), and a probability
conditional ([2, 65]). The CPH is usually adopted in conjunctionwith the Ramsey test ([6, 29, 84]),
which states that a probability judgment is made about a conditional, if A then C, by judging the
probability of C under the supposition that A holds, resulting in a degree of belief in C given A, the
conditional subjective probability PpC|Aq. We will use conditional event for such a conditional,
as our work here depends so much on de Finetti. By synthesizing the previous comments, in our
approach, a natural language conditional if A then C is looked at as a three-valued logical entity
which coincides with the conditional event C|A, formally defined in Section 2.1. Then, CPH
appears as a natural consequence.
One of the important implications of the CPH is that the natural language conditional cannot be
identified with the material conditional of truth functional logic, which is equivalent to sA_C (“not-
A or C”, as defined as usual) and which resembles Philo’s ancient conception of conditionals. The
material conditional is not a conditional event, since PpsA _ Cq “ PpC|Aq only in extreme cases,
e.g. when C “ A, in which case PpsA _ Cq “ PpsA _ Aq “ 1 “ PpA|Aq “ PpC|Aq, while in
general it holds that PpC|Aq ď PpsA _ Cq. Some philosophers (see, e.g., [54]) and psychologists
(see, e.g., [56]) have tried to argue that the natural language conditional is a material conditional
at its semantic core, but this cannot be right if the CPH is true (see [39] for a detailed study of the
probability of disjunctions and the conditional probability).
There are logical and philosophical arguments, and appeals to intuition, in support of the CPH.
Consider the simple indicative conditional:
(SH) If you spin the coin (S ), it will land heads (H).
Suppose we believe that the coin is fair. It would then seem clear that the probability of (SH), Ppif
S then Hq, is 0.5, i.e. PpH|S q “ .5 for a fair coin. If we suspect the coin is biased, we could
spin it a large number of times m and record the number of times n that it came up heads. The
ratio n{m would give us direct evidence about PpH|S q for the next spin, and intuitively that would
tell us how to judge Ppif S then Hq. We could then make a conditional bet on the next spin, by
placing “I bet that” at the beginning of (SH), using PpH|S q as the probability that we will win the
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bet (assuming that the bet is not called off), thus fixing the rational odds for it. Both [23] and [83]
related conditionals to conditional bets, and it is striking that the two founders of contemporary
subjective probability theory could have independently developed views of the conditional that
were so similar to each other.
Influenced by the above points, psychologists of reasoning have tested the CPH in controlled
experiments, and found that people tend to conform to it for a wide range of conditionals, from
indicative conditionals ([31, 35, 73]) and conditional bets ([5]) to counterfactuals and causal con-
ditionals ([69, 70, 81, 82]). In the opinion of some authors, the CPH may not hold for conditionals
if A then C when the antecedent A does not raise the probability of the conditional’s consequent C
([26, 88]), but the significance of this finding is open to dispute ([69]), and the general support
for the CPH has had a major impact in psychology ([30, 68]), formal epistemology ([76]), and
philosophical logic ([75, 78, 79, 80]). But what can we say about the semantics and logic of
conditionals, under CPH?
Stalnaker used a possible worlds analysis to give the formal semantics and logical properties
of a conditional that he claimed satisfied the CPH ([89, 90]), which is indeed sometimes termed
Stalnaker’s hypothesis ([28]). Stalnaker’s conditional, if A then C, is true in a possible world wx if
and only if C is true in the closest possible world wy to wx in which A is true, the closest A world.
The closest A world to wx is determined by similarity to wx. Where wy is the closest possible A
world to wx, wy will be the most similar A world to wx in facts and scientific laws, with the proviso
that A will be true in wy. Every world is most similar to itself, and so when A is true at wx, if A
then C is true at wx if and only if A^C is true at wx. The Stalnaker conditional if A then C is also
always true or false at a possible world in which A is false, a not-A world. For when A is false at
wx, if A then C will be true at wx if and only if A ^ C is true at the closest A world wy to wx.
For example, suppose there are four possible worlds, A^C, A^ sC, sA^C, and sA^ sC. Then, if
A then C will be true in the A^C world, and false in the A^ sC world. We assume that all of these
worlds have the probability of .25. Supposing that the A ^ C world is closer to the sA worlds than
the A^ sC world, the probability of the Stalnaker conditional if A then C is obtained by the sum of
the probabilities over the three worlds, PpA ^Cq ` PpsA ^Cq ` PpsA ^ sCq “ .75. This is because
the Stalnaker conditional is then true in the three worlds: A^C, sA^C, and sA^ sC. Now we note
that the conditional probability of C|A is .5. But the probability of the Stalnaker conditional is .75,
since it is true in three of the four worlds, and it has their probabilities. If, differently from above,
we suppose that the A^ sC world is closer to the sA worlds than the A^C world, then the probability
of the Stalnaker conditional if A then C is obtained by the probability of one world only, namely
PpA ^ Cq “ 0.25. This is because the Stalnaker conditional is now true in just the world: A ^ C.
The above examples show that the probability of the Stalnaker conditional is in general different
from the conditional probability PpC|Aq.
Lewis did more than illustrate this point: he proved a stronger result. Lewis strictly proved
that the CPH will not generally be satisfied for a conditional like Stalnaker’s, or Lewis’s own in
[64]. His proof is very instructive in revealing what the semantics of a conditional must be like for
it to satisfy the CPH, and so for it to be a conditional event. There are a number of variations of
Lewis’s proof, and some further proofs have been inspired by it ([6, 28]), but we discuss below a
version of the proof that best illustrates the properties that a conditional must have to satisfy the
CPH and so be a conditional event. Considering the relation between a conditional if A then C and
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its consequent C, and using the total probability theorem, in [65] it was derived:
Ppif A then Cq “ PpCqPppif A then Cq|Cq ` Pp sCqPppif A then Cq| sCq.
Assuming the CPH, Lewis then argued that Pppif A then Cq|Cq should be 1,2 and Pppif A then
Cq| sCq should be 0, with the result that Ppif A then Cq “ PpCq. This is an absurd result. As Lewis
put it, Ppif A then Cq can only be PpCq for “trivial” probability functions. He therefore inferred,
by reductio ad absurdum, that CPH must be rejected. He justified his claim that, given CPH, Pppif
A then Cq|Cq should be 1 by arguing that it should then equal the result of learning C for sure,
denoted by PCp. . .q, yielding PCpif A then Cq “ PCpC|Aq “ 1, and similarly for Pppif A then Cq| sCq
and learning not-C for sure, P sCp. . .q, with P sCpif A then Cq “ P sCpC|Aq “ 0 following.
In an early reply, van Fraassen ([91]) cast doubt on Lewis’s presupposition that the semantics
of a natural language conditional is independent of a person’s subjective epistemic state (see also
[57]). The semantics of a Stalnaker conditional is based on a similarity relation between possible
worlds, which is a (kind of subjective) qualitative comparison between possible worlds, and this
conditional is always objectively true or false, at A worlds and sA worlds, as we saw above. But it
has to be different for a conditional event. A conditional event if A then C cannot be objectively
true or false in sA worlds. As we will explain below in a more formal analysis, a conditional event
C|A is looked at as a three-valued logical entity, with values true, or false, or void (with an as-
sociated subjective degree of belief), according to whether C ^ A is true, or sC ^ A is true, or sA
is true, respectively. Moreover, from a numerical point of view C|A becomes a random quantity
(the indicator of C|A) with values: 1, when C|A is true; 0, when C|A is false; PpC|Aq, when C|A
is void. Notice that the use of PpC|Aq as numerical representation of the logical value void plays
a key role both in theoretical developments and in algorithms (for instance, the betting scheme,
the penalty criterion, coherence checking and propagation). Then, (by identifying logical and nu-
merical aspects) the conditional event C|A has the conditional probability, PpC|Aq, as its semantic
value in sA cases ([21, 36, 48, 55, 69, 77]). This value does, of course, depend on subjective mental
states, which concern the uncertainty on C (when A is assumed to be true), and the effect of these
on conditional probability judgments. The conditional event does not acquire probability from sA
worlds, because it is not objectively true at these worlds. Its value, PpC|Aq, in these worlds is its
overall expected value, or prevision in de Finetti’s terms, across all the A-worlds (indeed, the value
PpC|Aq is the result of a mental process in which A is assumed to be true and C may be true or
false across the A-worlds). The value PpC|Aq can be determined in a Ramsey test of if A then C,
by using operatively the betting scheme or the penalty criterion of de Finetti.
Another way to justify Lewis’s claim about what follows from the CPH is to use what has been
called the import-export principle ([66]):
2In logic under the material conditional interpretation, it is easy to see that if C, then (if A then C) is logically true
and, by the deduction theorem, the inference of if A then C from C is logically valid. This inference is also known as
one of the paradoxes of the material conditional, which is absurd when instantiated by natural language conditionals.
For standard approaches to probability, which define the conditional probability PpC|Aq by PpACq{PpAq—where
PpAq ą 0 is assumed to avoid a fraction over zero—one obtains PpC|Aq “ 1 when PpCq “ 1 (provided PpAq ą 0).
Thus, in this case, this paradox of the material conditional is inherited by such standard approaches to probability.
In the coherence approach, however, this paradox of the material conditional is blocked since even if PpCq “ 1,
0 ď PpC|Aq ď 1 (and it is not assumed that PpAq ą 0; for a proof see [74]).
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(IE) Ppif B then pif A then Cqq “ Ppif pA ^ Bq then Cq.
Using IE and a general form of CPH, one can prove that Pppif A then Cq|Cq should be 1, and Pppif
A then Cq| sCq should be 0. Indeed, assuming CPH and IE, as Pppif A then Cq|Cq “ Ppif C then pif A
then Cq, we can infer that Ppif C then pif A then Cqq “ Ppif (C^ Aq then Cq “ PpC|pA^Cqq “ 1.
Similarly under those assumptions, it follows that Pppif A then Cq| sCq “ 0. It is therefore clear
that, to avoid triviality, IE must fail for the conditional event, and in our formal analysis IE is false
for this conditional ([44, 48]). The expected values, or previsions (denoted by the symbol P), of
pif B then pif A then Cqq and pif pA^ Bq then Cq can diverge. Indeed, in our approach, it holds that
PpC|Aq “ PppC|Aq|CqPpCq ` PppC|Aq| sCqPp sCq,
which in general does not coincide with PpCq because PppC|Aq|Cq ‰ PpC|ACq “ 1 and
PppC|Aq| sCq ‰ PpC|A sCq “ 0 (see [48, Theorem 6]). Thus Lewis’s triviality is avoided (see also
[92] for an experimental study of Lewis / Stalnaker conditionals and the import-export principle).
Douven and Dietz ([28]) aimed to show that there is a serious problem with the CPH without
making assumptions about the relation between conditionals and subjective semantic values. Their
argument depends on their observation that a conditional that satisfies the CPH will be probabilis-
tically independent of its antecedent:
(IA) PpA|pif A then Cqq “ PpAq.
We will examine the validity of (IA) formally for the iterated conditional A|pC|Aq in what follows
(see Section 4), and make some points about probabilistic independence and uncorrelation in our
approach (see Section 8). But at this point, we will focus on the instructive argument of Douven
and Dietz that (IA) should be rejected for the natural language conditional, implying that CPH is
false. Douven and Dietz used an example for their argument, and we will slightly simplify the
conditional as follows:
(ES) If Sue passed the exam (A), she will go on a skiing holiday (C).
In the example, Harry sees Sue buying some skiing equipment, and this surprises him because he
knows that she recently had an exam, which he believes she is unlikely to have passed, making
PpAq low for him. But then Harry meets Tom, who tells him that (ES) is likely. This informa-
tion increases Ppif A then Cq for Harry, which means that PpC|Aq increases for Harry, assuming
that CPH holds. Douven and Dietz argue that it is intuitively right that PpAq should go up for
Harry, given this information about (ES), since a high PpAq explains why Sue bought the skiing
equipment. But then (IA) cannot be accepted, because it implies that PpAq will be unaffected by
conditioning on if A then C. We draw a different conclusion from this useful example.
Among other things we will show that, by replacing the antecedent C|A by pC|Aq ^ C, we
will reach the conclusion that the degree of belief in A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq is greater than or equal to
PpAq. This reasoning is a form of abductive inference ([27], see also [24]), which is related to
the classical “fallacy” of Affirmation of the Consequent (AC): from if A then C and C infer A.
Under the material conditional interpretation of conditionals, AC is not logically valid. Therefore,
it is classically called a fallacy. However, we will compute the lower and upper bounds for the
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conclusion of AC, showing when AC can be a strong, though not valid, inference for reasoning
under partial knowledge. We will expand our analysis by considering iterated conditionals. We
will use this analysis to take account of implicit information that can be present in particular
contexts. This added information will explain the intuition that the degree of belief in A should
sometimes increase given if A then C. We will also make some comments about uncorrelation and
probabilistic independence, pointing out in particular that the event A and the conditional if A then
C are uncorrelated, but not probabilistically independent, and we will explain why this distinction
does not lead to counterintuitive results.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall some basic notions and results
on coherence, logical operations among conditional events, and iterated conditionals. In Section 3
we study the antecedent-nested conditional if (C when A), then D. In Section 4 we analyze the
particular case where D “ A, by studying the antecedent-nested conditional if (C when A), then
A and by considering selected related iterated conditionals. In addition, we discuss and apply
our results to the above mentioned Harry and Sue example (ES). In Section 5 we consider the
generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq which allows to make some latent information
explicit, such that the degree of belief in A increases. In Section 6 we refine the study of the lower
and upper bounds for the AC rule. In Section 7 we examine selected further cases where, based
on suitable generalized iterated conditionals, the degree of belief in A increases. In Section 8 we
discuss and correctly interpret a product formula for the conjunction of two conditionals using the
notion of uncorrelation, rather than probabilistic independence, between two random quantities.
In Section 9 we give a summary of the paper, by adding some final comments.
2. Preliminary notions and results
In this section we recall some basic notions and results concerning coherence (see, e.g., [10,
12, 15, 19, 72]), logical operations among conditional events, and iterated conditionals (see [44,
45, 48, 49, 51, 87]).
2.1. Conditional events and coherent conditional probability assessments
In real world applications, we very often have to manage uncertainty about the facts, which are
described by (non-ambiguous) logical propositions. For dealing with unknown facts we use the
notion of event. In formal terms, an event A is a two-valued logical entity which can be true, or
false. The indicator of A, denoted by the same symbol, is 1, or 0, according to whether A is true,
or false. The sure event and the impossible event are denoted by Ω and H, respectively. Given
two events A and B, we denote by A ^ B, or simply by AB, (resp., A _ B) the logical conjunction
(resp., the logical disjunction). The negation of A is denoted by sA. We simply write A Ď B to
denote that A logically implies B, that is AsB “ H. We recall that n events A1, . . . , An are logically
independent when the number m of constituents, or possible worlds, generated by them is 2n (in
general m ď 2n).
Given two events A, H, with H ‰ H, the conditional event A|H is defined as a three-valued
logical entity which is true, or false, or void, according to whether AH is true, or sAH is true,
or sH is true, respectively. The notion of logical inclusion among events has been generalized to
conditional events by Goodman and Nguyen in [53] (see also [47] for some related results). Given
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two conditional events A|H and B|K, we say that A|H implies B|K, denoted by A|H Ď B|K, iff
AH true implies BK true and sBK true implies sAH true; i.e., iff AH Ď BK and sBK Ď sAH. In
the subjective approach to probability based on the betting scheme, to assess PpA|Hq “ x means
that, for every real number s, you are willing to pay (resp., to receive) an amount sx and to receive
(resp., to pay) s, or 0, or sx, according to whether AH is true, or sAH is true, or sH is true (bet called
off), respectively. The random gain, which is the difference between the (random) amount that you
receive and the amount that you pay, is
G “ psAH ` 0sAH ` sx sHq ´ sx “ sAH ` sxp1´ Hq ´ sx “ sHpA ´ xq.
In what follows, we assume that the probabilistic assessments are coherent (see Definition 2). In
particular, the coherence of any assessment x “ PpA|Hq is equivalent to min GH ď 0 ď max GH,
@ s, where GH is the set of values of G restricted to H. Then, the set Π of coherent assessments x
on A|H is: piq Π “ r0, 1s, whenH ‰ AH ‰ H; piiq Π “ t0u, when AH “ H; piiiq Π “ t1u, when
AH “ H. In numerical terms, once x “ PpA|Hq is assessed by the betting scheme, the indicator
of A|H, denoted by the same symbol, is defined as 1, or 0, or x, according to whether AH is true,
or sAH is true, or sH is true. Then, by setting PpA|Hq “ x,
A|H “ AH ` x sH “ AH ` xp1 ´ Hq “
$&
%
1, if AH is true,
0, if sAH is true,
x, if sH is true, (1)
and when you pay sx the amount that you receive is s A|H “ spAH ` x sHq, with a random gain
given by G “ sHpA ´ xq “ spA|H ´ xq. In particular, when s “ 1, you pay x and receive A|H.
Notice that, when H Ď A (i.e., AH “ H), by coherence PpA|Hq “ 1 and hence A|H “ H` sH “ 1.
The negation of a conditional event A|H is defined by sA|H, which coincides with 1´ A|H.
Remark 1. We point out that the definition of (the indicator of) A|H is not circular because by
the betting scheme the three-valued numerical entity A|H is defined once the value x “ PpA|Hq is
assessed. We recall that a systematic study concerning the third value of a conditional event has
been developed in [17], where it has been shown that it satisfies all the properties of a conditional
probability. In addition, an extension in the setting of possibility theory and to general measures
of uncertainty has been given in [13, 18]. The semantics of our approach is probabilistic; then,
by the betting scheme, the third value for the indicator of A|H is PpA|Hq. Notice that, given two
conditional events A|H and B|K, for their indicators it makes sense to check the inequality A|H ď
B|K. For instance, the inequality holds when the conditional events satisfy the Goodman and
Nguyen relation, i.e. A|H Ď B|K. Indeed, in this case coherence requires that PpA|Hq ď PpB|Kq
and hence A|H ď B|K (see also [47, Theorem 6]).
Given a probability function P defined on an arbitrary familyK of conditional events, consider
a finite subfamily F “ tE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnu Ď K and the vector P “ pp1, . . . , pnq, where pi “
PpEi|Hiq is the assessed probability for the conditional event Ei|Hi, i P t1, . . . , nu. With the pair
pF ,Pq we associate the random gain G “
řn
i“1 siHipEi ´ piq “
řn
i“1 sipEi|Hi ´ piq. We denote
by GHn the set of values of G restricted to Hn “ H1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Hn, i.e., the set of values of G when
Hn is true. Then, we recall below the notion of coherence in the context of the betting scheme.
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Definition 1. The function P defined on K is coherent if and only if, @n ě 1, @ s1, . . . , sn, @F “
tE1|H1, . . . , En|Hnu Ď K , it holds that: min GHn ď 0 ď max GHn .
As shown by Definition1, the function P is coherent if and only if, in any finite combination
of n bets, it cannot happen that the values in the set GHn are all positive, or all negative (no Dutch
Book).
2.2. Conditional random quantities and coherent conditional prevision assessments
More in general, if A is replaced by a random quantity X, denoting by P the symbol of previ-
sion, to assess PpX|Hq “ µ means that, for every real number s, you are willing to pay an amount
sµ and to receive sX, or sµ, according to whether H is true, or sH is true (the bet is called off),
respectively. Of course, when X is an event A, it holds that PpX|Hq “ PpA|Hq. The random gain
is G “ spX`µ sHq´ sµ “ sHpX´µq. By following the approach given in [17, 40, 44, 45, 48, 59],
once specified a coherent assessment µ “ PpX|Hq, the conditional random quantity X|H is defined
as X, or µ, according to whether H is true, or sH is true. Then, X|H “ XH ` µ sH and the random
gain associated with a bet on X|H is G “ sHpX ´ µq “ spX|H ´ µq, that is G is the difference
between what you receive, sX|H, and what you pay, sµ. Denoting by XH “ tx1, . . . , xru the set
of possible values of X restricted to H and by setting A j “ pX “ x jq, j “ 1, . . . , r, it holds thatŽr
j“1 A j “ H and
X|H “ XH ` µ sH “ x1A1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` xrAr ` µ sH. (2)
In what follows, for any given conditional random quantity X|H, we assume that, when H is true,
the set of possible values of X is finite. In this case we say that X|H is a finite conditional random
quantity. Given a prevision function P defined on an arbitrary family K of finite conditional
random quantities, consider a finite subfamily F “ tX1|H1, . . . , Xn|Hnu Ď K and the vectorM “
pµ1, . . . , µnq, where µi “ PpXi|Hiq is the assessed prevision for the conditional random quantity
Xi|Hi, i P t1, . . . , nu. With the pair pF ,Mqwe associate the random gainG “
řn
i“1 siHipXi´µiq “řn
i“1 sipXi|Hi ´ µiq. We denote by GHn the set of values of G restricted to Hn “ H1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Hn.
Then, the notion of coherence is defined as below.
Definition 2. The function P defined on K is coherent if and only if, @n ě 1, @ s1, . . . , sn, @F “
tX1|H1, . . . , Xn|Hnu Ď K , it holds that: min GHn ď 0 ď max GHn .
In particular, by Definition 2, the coherence of a prevision assessment PpX|Hq “ µ is equiv-
alent to minXH ď µ ď maxXH, where we recall that XH is the set of valued of X when H is
true.
Given a family F “ tX1|H1, . . . , Xn|Hnu, for each i P t1, . . . , nu we denote by txi1, . . . , xiriu
the set of possible values of Xi when Hi is true; then, we set Ai j “ pXi “ xi jq, i “ 1, . . . , n,
j “ 1, . . . , ri. We set C0 “ sH1 ¨ ¨ ¨ sHn (it may be C0 “ H) and we denote by C1, . . . ,Cm the
constituents contained in Hn “ H1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Hn. Hence
Źn
i“1pAi1 _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ Airi _ sHiq “ Žmh“0 Ch.
With each Ch, h P t1, . . . , mu, we associate a vector Qh “ pqh1, . . . , qhnq, where qhi “ xi j if
Ch Ď Ai j, j “ 1, . . . , ri, while qhi “ µi if Ch Ď sHi; with C0 we associate Q0 “M “ pµ1, . . . , µnq.
Denoting by I the convex hull of Q1, . . . , Qm, the conditionM P I amounts to the existence of
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a vector pλ1, . . . , λmq such that:
řm
h“1 λhQh “ M ,
řm
h“1 λh “ 1 , λh ě 0 , @ h; in other words,
M P I is equivalent to the solvability of the system pΣq, associated with pF ,Mq,
pΣq
řm
h“1 λhqhi “ µi , i P t1, . . . , nu ,
řm
h“1 λh “ 1, λh ě 0 , h P t1, . . . , mu . (3)
Given the assessmentM “ pµ1, . . . , µnq on F “ tX1|H1, . . . , Xn|Hnu, let S be the set of solutions
Λ “ pλ1, . . . , λmq of system pΣq. We point out that the solvability of system pΣq is a necessary
(but not sufficient) condition for coherence ofM on F . When pΣq is solvable, that is S ‰ H, we
define:
I0 “ ti : maxΛPS
ř
h:ChĎHi
λh “ 0u, F0 “ tXi|Hi , i P I0u, M0 “ pµi, i P I0q . (4)
For what concerns the probabilistic meaning of I0, it holds that i P I0 if and only if the (unique)
coherent extension of M to Hi|Hn is zero. Then, the following theorem can be proved ([11,
Theorem 3]):
Theorem 1 (Operative characterization of coherence). A conditional prevision assessmentM “
pµ1, . . . , µnq on the family F “ tX1|H1, . . . , Xn|Hnu is coherent if and only if the following condi-
tions are satisfied:
(i) the system pΣq defined in (3) is solvable; (ii) if I0 ‰ H, thenM0 is coherent.
Coherence can be characterized in terms of proper scoring rules ([12, 43]), which can be related
to the notion of entropy in information theory ([60, 61, 62, 63]). The result below ([48, Theorem
4]) shows that if two conditional random quantities X|H, Y|K coincide when H _ K is true, then
X|H and Y|K also coincide when H _ K is false, and hence X|H coincides with Y|K in all cases.
Theorem 2. Given any events H ‰ H and K ‰ H, and any random quantities X and Y , let Π be
the set of the coherent prevision assessments PpX|Hq “ µ and PpY|Kq “ ν.
piq Assume that, for every pµ, νq P Π, X|H “ Y|K when H _ K is true; then µ “ ν for every
pµ, νq P Π.
piiq For every pµ, νq P Π, X|H “ Y|K when H _ K is true if and only if X|H “ Y|K.
Remark 2. Theorem 2 has been generalized in [51, Theorem 6] by replacing the symbol ““”
by “ď” in statements piq and piiq. In other words, if X|H ď Y|K when H _ K is true, then
PpX|Hq ď PpY|Kq and hence X|H ď Y|K in all cases.
2.3. Conjoined and iterated conditionals
We recall now the notions of conjoined (e.g., pif H then Aq and pif K then Bq), disjoined (e.g.,
pif H then Aq or pif K then Bq), and iterated conditionals (e.g., if pif H then Aq, then pif K then Bq),
which were introduced in the framework of conditional random quantities ([44, 45, 48]).
Definition 3. Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, with PpA|Hq “ x and
PpB|Kq “ y, their conjunction pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq is the conditional random quantity defined as
pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq “ pAHBK ` x sHBK ` ysKAHq|pH _ Kq “
$’’’’&
’’’’%
1, if AHBK is true,
0, if sAH _ sBK is true,
x, if sHBK is true,
y, if AH sK is true,
z, if sH sK is true,
(5)
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where z “ PrpA|Hq ^ pB|Kqs “ PrpAHBK ` x sHBK ` ysKAHq|pH _ Kqs.
In betting terms z represents the amount you agree to pay, with the proviso that you will receive
the quantity
pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq “ AHBK ` x sHBK ` ysKAH ` z sH sK, (6)
which assumes one of the following values:
• 1, if both conditional events are true;
• 0, if at least one of the conditional events is false;
• the probability of the conditional event that is void, if one conditional event is void and the
other one is true;
• z (the amount that you payed), if both conditional events are void.
The result below shows that Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds still hold for the conjunction of two condi-
tional events ([48, Theorem 7]).
Theorem 3. Given any coherent assessment px, yq on tA|H, B|Ku, with A, H, B, K logically inde-
pendent, and with H ‰ H, K ‰ H, the extension z “ PrpA|Hq ^ pB|Kqs is coherent if and only if
the following Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds are satisfied:
maxtx ` y´ 1, 0u “ z1 ď z ď z2 “ mintx, yu . (7)
We observe that, by logical independence, the assessment px, yq on tA|H, B|Ku is coherent
for every px, yq P r0, 1s2. Moreover, the main aspect in the proof of Theorem 3 shows that the
assessment px, y, zq is coherent if and only if it belongs to the tetrahedron with vertices the points
p1, 1, 1q, p1, 0, 0q, p0, 1, 0q, p0, 0, 0q.
Remark 3. Notice that, the assumption of logical independence plays a key role for the validity
of Theorem 3. Indeed, in case of some logical dependencies, for the interval rz1, z2s of coherent
extensions z, it holds that maxtx ` y ´ 1, 0u ď z1 ď z2 ď mintx, yu. For instance, when H “ K
and AB “ H, the coherence of the assessment px, yq on tA|H, B|Hu is equivalent to the condition
x ` y ´ 1 ď 0. In this case, it holds that pA|Hq ^ pB|Hq “ AB|H with PpAB|Hq “ 0; then, the
unique coherent extension on AB|H is z “ 0. As another example, in the case A “ B, with A, H, K
assumed to be logically independent, it holds that the assessment px, yq on tA|H, A|Ku is coherent
for every px, yq P r0, 1s2. Moreover, the extension z is coherent if and only if xy ď z ď mintx, yu
(see [50, Theorem 5]). Finally, we remark that in all cases, for each coherent extension z it holds
that z P rz1, z2s Ď r0, 1s; thus pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq P r0, 1s.
Other approaches to compounded conditionals, which are not based on coherence, can be
found in [57, 67] (see also [14, 33]). A study of the lower and upper bounds for other definitions
of conjunction, where the conjunction is a conditional event like Adams’ quasi conjunction, has
been given [85]. Based on the structure of (1), i.e. l|© “ l ^ © ` Ppl|©qs©, which we use
with l “ B|K and© “ A|H, the notion of iterated conditional pB|Kq|pA|Hq is defined as follows
(see, e.g., [44, 45, 48]):
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Definition 4. Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, with AH ‰ H, let px, y, zq be
a coherent assessment on tA|H, B|K, pA|Hq ^ pB|Kqu. The iterated conditional pB|Kq|pA|Hq is
defined as the conditional random quantity
pB|Kq|pA|Hq “ pB|Kq ^ pA|Hq ` µ sA|H “
$’’’’’’’’&
’’’’’’’%
1, if AHBK is true,
0, if AHsBK is true,
y, if AH sK is true,
x ` µp1´ xq, if sHBK is true,
µp1´ xq, if sHsBK is true,
z ` µp1´ xq, if sH sK is true,
µ, if sAH is true,
(8)
where µ “ PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs.
Within betting scheme, to assess PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs “ µ means in particular that you are willing
to pay the amount µ, with the proviso that you will receive the quantity pA|Hq^pB|Kq`µ sA|H. Of
course, as specified in Definition 4, this bet requires that you preliminarily evaluate (in a coherent
way) the quantities: x “ PpA|Hq, y “ PpB|Kq, and z “ PrpA|Hq ^ pB|Kqs. Notice that, when
H “ K “ Ω, the iterated conditional pB|Ωq|pA|Ωq becomes the conditional event B|A.
Definition 4 allows us to represent antecedent-nested and consequent-nested conditionals.
These are, respectively, conditionals with other conditionals as antecedents, and conditionals with
other conditionals as consequents. As an example of a natural language instantiation of such a
conditional consider the following:
“If the match is canceled if it starts raining, then the match is canceled if it starts
snowing” (p. 45 of [26]).
Remark 4. Notice that we assume AH ‰ H to give a nontrivial meaning to the notion of the
iterated conditional. Indeed, if AH were equal toH (and of course H ‰ H), that is A|H “ 0, then
it would be the case that sA|H “ 1 and pB|Kq|pA|Hq “ pB|Kq|0 “ pB|Kq ^ pA|Hq ` µsA|H “ µ
would follow; that is, pB|Kq|pA|Hq would coincide with the (indeterminate) value µ. Similarly
in the case of B|H (which is of no interest). Thus the trivial iterated conditional pB|Kq|0 is not
considered in our approach. In betting terms, both situations mean that you get your money back
because these bets are always called-off.
We observe that, by the linearity of prevision, it holds that
µ “ PppB|Kq|pA|Hqq “ PppB|Kq ^ pA|Hq ` µ sA|Hq “ PppB|Kq ^ pA|Hqq ` Ppµ sA|Hq “
“ PppB|Kq ^ pA|Hqq ` µ PpsA|Hq “ z ` µp1´ xq ,
from which it follows that ([45])
z “ PppB|Kq ^ pA|Hqq “ µx “ PppB|Kq|pA|HqqPpA|Hq. (9)
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Here, when x ą 0, we obtain µ “ z
x
P r0, 1s. Based on the equality µ “ z ` µp1´ xq, formula (8)
can be written as
pB|Kq|pA|Hq “
$’’’’’’&
’’’’’’%
1, if AHBK is true,
0, if AHsBK is true,
y, if AH sK is true,
x` µp1 ´ xq, if sHBK is true,
µp1´ xq, if sHsBK is true,
µ, if sAH _ sH sK is true.
(10)
In particular, when x “ 0, it holds that
pB|Kq|pA|Hq “
$’’&
’’%
1, if AHBK is true,
0, if AHsBK is true,
y, if AH sK is true,
µ, if sAH _ sH is true.
As we can see, in order that the prevision assessment µ on pB|Kq|pA|Hq be coherent, µ must
belong to the convex hull of the values 0, y, 1; that is, (also when x “ 0) it must be that µ P r0, 1s.
Then, pB|Kq|pA|Hq P r0, 1s. In general, in [87, Theorem 3] it has been given the following result:
Theorem 4. Let A, B, H, K be any logically independent events. The set Π of all coherent assess-
ments px, y, z, µq on the family F “ tA|H, B|K, pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq, pB|Kq|pA|Hqu is Π “ Π1 Y Π2,
where
Π1 “ tpx, y, z, µq : x P p0, 1s, y P r0, 1s, z P rz1, z2s, µ “ z
x
u,
with z1 “ maxtx ` y´ 1, 0u, z2 “ mintx, yu, and
Π2 “ tp0, y, 0, µq : py, µq P r0, 1s2u.
(11)
Remark 5. We note that the iterated conditional pB|Kq|A is (not a conditional event but) a con-
ditional random quantity. Moreover, pB|Kq|A does not coincide with the conditional event B|AK
(see [48, Section 3.3]). Thus the import-export principle ([67]), which says that pB|Kq|A “ B|AK,
does not hold (as, e.g., in [1, 57]). Therefore, as shown in [48], we avoid the counter-intuitive
consequences related to the well-known Lewis’ first triviality result ([65]).
Remark 6. As a further comment on the import-export principle, we observe that given any ran-
dom quantity X and any events H, K, with H ‰ H, K ‰ H, it holds that (see [44, Proposition 1]):
pX|Kq|H “ pX|Hq|K “ X|HK, when H Ď K or K Ď H. Of course, X|HK coincides with X|H,
or X|K, according to whether H Ď K, or K Ď H, respectively. In particular, when X is an event
A, it holds that pA|Kq|H “ pA|Hq|K “ A|HK. Then, given any two events H, K, with K ‰ H, as
K Ď H _ K, it holds that: pX|Kq|pH _ Kq “ X|K.
We recall the notion of conjunction of n conditional events ([51]).
Definition 5. Let n conditional events E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn be given. For each non-empty subset S
of t1, . . . , nu, let xS be a prevision assessment on
Ź
iPS pEi|Hiq. Then, the conjunction C1¨¨¨n “
pE1|H1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ pEn|Hnq is defined as
C1¨¨¨n “
$&
%
1, if
Źn
i“1 EiHi is true
0, if
Žn
i“1
sEiHi is true,
xS , if
Ź
iPS
sHiŹiRS EiHi is true. (12)
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In the betting framework, you agree to pay PpC1¨¨¨nq with the proviso that you will receive:
• 1, if all conditional events are true;
• 0, if at least one of the conditional events is false;
• the prevision of the conjunction of those conditional events which are void, otherwise.
The operation of conjunction is associative and commutative. In addition, the following mono-
tonicity property holds ([51, Theorem 7])
C1¨¨¨n`1 ď C1¨¨¨n. (13)
We recall the following generalized notion of iterated conditional ([51, Definition 14]).
Definition 6. Let n`1 conditional events E1|H1, . . . , En`1|Hn`1, with pE1|H1q^¨ ¨ ¨^pEn|Hnq ‰ 0,
be given. We denote by pEn`1|Hn`1q|ppE1|H1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ pEn|Hnqq the following random quantity
pE1|H1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ pEn`1|Hn`1q ` µp1 ´ pE1|H1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ pEn|Hnqq.
where µ “ PrpEn`1|Hn`1q|ppE1|H1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ pEn|Hnqqs.
Definition 6 extends the notion of the iterated conditional pE2|H2q|pE1|H1q given in Defini-
tion 4 to the case where the antecedent is a conjunction of conditional events. Based on the betting
metaphor, the quantity µ is the amount to be paid in order to receive the amount Cn`1` µp1´Cnq,
where Cn`1 “ pE1|H1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ pEn`1|Hn`1q and Cn “ pE1|H1q ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ pEn|Hnq. We ob-
serve that, defining PpCnq “ zn and PpCn`1q “ zn`1, by the linearity of prevision it holds that
µ “ zn`1 ` µp1 ´ znq; then, zn`1 “ µzn, that is
PpCn`1q “ PrpEn`1|Hn`1q|CnsPpCnq, (14)
which is the compound prevision theorem for the generalized iterated conditionals.
3. The iterated conditional D|pC|Aq
In this section we analyze the iterated conditional D|pC|Aq (see, e.g., [25, 57]) which is a more
general version of the iterated conditional of interest A|pC|Aq that will be studied in Section 4.
We examine the object D|pC|Aq in the framework of the betting scheme. Given any real number
x P r0, 1s, we denote by px ą 0q the event which is true or false, according to whether x is positive
or zero, respectively. By the symbol px ą 0qE we denote the conjunction between px ą 0q and
any event E. Then, the event AC _ px ą 0qsA coincides with AC _ sA, or AC, according to whether
x is positive or zero, respectively. The next result shows that D|pC|Aq is a conditional random
quantity, where the (dynamic) conditioning event is AC _ px ą 0qsA.
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Theorem 5. Let a coherent assessment px, µq on tC|A, D|pC|Aqu be given. The iterated conditional
D|pC|Aq is the conditional random quantity
D|pC|Aq “ rACD ` px` µp1´ xqqsAD ` µp1´ xqsAsDs|rAC _ px ą 0qsAs “
“
$&
%
D|AC, if x “ 0,
rACD ` px ` µp1´ xqqsAD ` µp1 ´ xqsAsDs|pAC _ sAq, if 0 ă x ă 1,
D|pAC _ sAq, if x “ 1.
(15)
Proof. Let us consider a bet on D|pC|Aq, with A ‰ H,C ‰ H, PpC|Aq “ x, and PrD|pC|Aqs “ µ.
In this bet, µ is the amount that you agree to pay, while D|pC|Aq is the amount that you receive.
We observe that the bet on D|pC|Aq must be called off in all cases where the random gain G “
D|pC|Aq ´ PrD|pC|Aqs “ D|pC|Aq ´ µ coincides with zero, whatever be the assessed value µ. In
other words, the bet must be called off in all cases where the amount D|pC|Aq that you receive
coincides with the quantity that you payed µ, whatever be the assessed value µ. By applying (10)
to the iterated conditional pD|Ωq|pC|Aq “ D|pC|Aq, we obtain
D|pC|Aq “ D ^ pC|Aq ` µp1´ C|Aq “
$’’’’&
’’’’%
1, if ACD is true,
0, if AC sD is true,
µ, if A sC is true,
x ` µp1´ xq, if sAD is true,
µp1´ xq, if sAsD is true.
(16)
We distinguish three cases: piq x “ 0; piiq 0 ă x ă 1; piiiq x “ 1. We show that in case piq the bet
is called off when sA _ sC is true; in cases piiq and piiiq the bet is called off when sAC is true.
Case piq. As x “ 0, formula (16) becomes
D|pC|Aq “
$’’’’&
’’’’%
1, if ACD is true,
0, if AC sD is true,
µ, if A sC is true,
µ, if sAD is true,
µ, if sAsD is true,
“
$&
%
1, if ACD is true,
0, if AC sD is true,
µ, if sA _ sC is true. (17)
By setting t “ PpD|ACq it holds that
D|AC “
$&
%
1, if ACD is true,
0, if AC sD is true,
t, if sA _ sC is true. (18)
Then, based on Theorem 2, from (17) and (18) it follows that µ “ t and hence
D|pC|Aq “ D|AC, if x “ 0. (19)
That is, the two objects D|pC|Aq and D|AC coincide when x “ 0. Here, the bet on D|pC|Aq is
called off when ĎAC “ sA _ sC is true.
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Case piiq. As 0 ă x ă 1, from (16) the equality D|pC|Aq “ µ holds for every µ only when A sC
is true. This means that the bet on D|pC|Aq is called off when A sC is true. Then the conditioning
event isĚA sC “ C _ sA “ AC _ sA and hence
D|pC|Aq “ rACD ` px ` µp1´ xqqsAD ` µp1´ xqsAsDs|rAC _ sAs, if 0 ă x ă 1. (20)
Case piiiq. As x “ 1, the iterated conditional D|pC|Aq coincides with the conditional event
D|pAC _ sAq. Indeed, in this case formula (16) becomes
D|pC|Aq “
$’’’’&
’’’’%
1, if ACD is true,
0, if AC sD is true,
µ, if A sC is true,
1, if sAD is true,
0, if sAsD is true,
“
$&
%
1, if pAC _ sAqD is true,
0, if pAC _ sAqsD is true,
µ, if A sC is true. (21)
In addition, by setting ν “ PpD|pAC _ sAqq it holds that,
D|pAC _ sAq “
$&
%
1, if pAC _ sAqD is true,
0, if pAC _ sAqsD is true,
ν, if A sC is true. (22)
Then, based on Theorem 2, from (21) and (22) it follows that µ “ ν and hence
D|pC|Aq “ D|pAC _ sAq, if x “ 1. (23)
We remark that (23) also follows by observing that when x “ 1 it holds that C|A “ AC ` xsA “
AC ` sA “ AC _ A. Then, we directly obtain D|pC|Aq “ D|pAC _ sAq.
Finally, by unifying (19), (20), and (23), we obtain
D|pC|Aq “ rACD ` px` µp1´ xqqsAD ` µp1´ xqsAsDs|rAC _ px ą 0qsAs.
Remark 7. As shown in Theorem 5, in general D|pC|Aq ‰ D|AC; that is, the import-export
principle is invalid also for antecedent-nested conditionals3. Indeed, D|pC|Aq “ D|AC only when
x “ 0 (in this special case the import-export principle holds) and D|pC|Aq “ D|pAC _ sAq only
when x “ 1. In addition, AC Ď C|A Ď AC _ sA (logical inclusion among conditional events),
which in numerical terms implies AC ď C|A ď AC _ sA. However, there are no order relations
among the three objects D|AC, D|pC|Aq, and D|pAC _ sAq (see Table 1).
Theorem 6. Let A,C, D be three events, with AC ‰ H. Then, sD|pC|Aq “ 1´ D|pC|Aq.
3This result answers to a specific question that G. Coletti posed to N. Pfeifer during the conference “Reasoning
under partial knowledge” (Perugia, Italy, December 14–15, 2018) in honor of her 70th birthday.
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Constituent D|AC D|pC|Aq D|pAC _ sAq
x “ 0 0 ă x ă 1 x “ 1
ACD 1 1 1 1 1
AC sD 0 0 0 0 0
A sC t µ µ µ νsAD t µ x ` µp1´ xq 1 1sAsD t µ µp1´ xq 0 0
Table 1: D|pC|Aq coincides with D|AC, when x “ 0. D|pC|Aq coincides with D|pAC _ sAq, when x “ 1. When
0 ă x ă 1 there are no order relations among D|AC, D|pC|Aq, and D|pAC _ sAq.
Proof. We distinguish two cases: case piq x ą 0 and case piiq x “ 0.
Case piq. We set PpC|Aq “ x, PrD ^ pC|Aqs “ z, and PrD|pC|Aqs “ µ. Then, we recall that
by the linearity of prevision PrD|pC|Aqs “ PrD ^ pC|Aqs ` µPr1 ´ C|As, that is z “ µx. By
setting PrsD|pC|Aqs “ η and by applying (10) to the iterated conditional psD|Ωq|pC|Aq “ sD|pC|Aq,
we obtain sD|pC|Aq “ sD ^ pC|Aq ` ηp1 ´ C|Aq. Then, as C|A “ D ^ pC|Aq ` sD ^ pC|Aq (see
(Proposition 1 in [86]), it holds that
sD|pC|Aq “ C|A ´ D ^ pC|Aq ` ηp1 ´ C|Aq “
$’’’&
’’’%
0, if ACD is true,
1, if AC sD is true,
η, if A sC is true,
ηp1´ xq, if sAD is true,
x ` ηp1´ xq, if sAsD is true.
(24)
By the linearity of prevision it holds that PrsD|pC|Aqs “ PpC|Aq ´ PrD ^ pC|Aqs ` ηPr1 ´ C|As,
that is η “ x ´ z ` ηp1 ´ xq, shortly: z “ x ´ ηx. From z “ µx and z “ x ´ ηx it follows that
µx “ x ´ ηx, that is x “ pµ` ηqx. Then, as x ą 0, it follows that η “ 1 ´ µ. In Table 2 we show
that D|pC|Aq ` sD|pC|Aq is constant and coincides with 1 in all possible cases.
Constituent D|pC|Aq sD|pC|Aq D|pC|Aq ` sD|pC|Aq
ACD 1 0 1
AC sD 0 1 1
A sC µ 1´ µ 1sAD x ` µ´ µx p1´ µqp1 ´ xq “ 1´ µ´ x ` µx 1sAsD µ´ µx x ` p1´ µqp1 ´ xq “ 1´ µ` µx 1
Table 2: Numerical values of D|pC|Aq, sD|pC|Aq, and D|pC|Aq ` sD|pC|Aq in the case when x “ PpC|Aq ą 0 and
µ “ PrD|pC|Aqs. By coherence, PrsD|pC|Aqs “ 1´ µ. See also equations (16) and (24).
Case piiq. As x “ 0, from Theorem 5 (see equation (19)), it holds that D|pC|Aq “ D|AC. Likewise,
it holds that sD|pC|Aq “ sD|AC. Therefore, D|pC|Aq` sD|pC|Aq “ D|AC` sD|AC “ Ω|AC “ 1.
We observe that in case of some logical dependencies among the events A,C, D some con-
stituents may become impossible, in which case some lines in Table 2 disappear; but, of course,
Theorem 6 still holds.
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Notice that, based on Theorem 6, a natural notion of negation for D|pC|Aq is given by sD|pC|Aq,
which corresponds to the narrow-scope negation of conditionals. We recall that also the (non-
nested) conditional is traditionally negated by the narrow-scope negation of conditionals, i.e., the
negation of C|A is defined by sC|A “ 1´ C|A (see Section 2.1).
4. The iterated conditional A|pC|Aq
In this section we focus the analysis on the iterated conditional A|pC|Aq, which is a special
case of D|pC|Aq when D “ A. After describing A|pC|Aq as a conditional random quantity (with
a dynamic conditioning event), we obtain the equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq, under the assumption
PpC|Aq ą 0. We also illustrate an urn experiment where such equality is natural. Then, we study
some relations among A|AC, A|pC|Aq, and A|pAC_ sAq by showing in particular that A|pAC_ sAq ď
A|pC|Aq ď A|AC. In addition, we give further results related with the equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq
and then we consider the Sue example.
4.1. The iterated conditional A|pC|Aq and its prevision
We recall that A ^ pC|Aq “ AC, indeed
A ^ pC|Aq “
$&
%
1, if AC is true,
0, if A sC is true,
0, if sA is true; “
"
1, if AC is true,
0, if sA _ sC is true; “ AC. (25)
By setting µ “ PrA|pC|Aqs and x “ PpC|Aq, from (10) and (25) we obtain
A|pC|Aq “ A ^ pC|Aq ` µp1´ C|Aq “ AC ` µp1´ C|Aq “
$&
%
1, if AC is true,
µp1´ xq, if sA is true,
µ, if A sC is true. (26)
Then, by applying Theorem 5 with D “ A, we obtain
Corollary 1. Let a coherent assessment px, µq on tC|A, A|pC|Aqu be given. The iterated condi-
tional A|pC|Aq is the conditional random quantity
A|pC|Aq “ rAC ` µp1´ xqsAs|rAC _ px ą 0qsAs “
“
$&
%
A|AC, if x “ 0,
rAC ` µp1´ xqsAs|pAC _ sAq, if 0 ă x ă 1,
A|pAC _ sAq, if x “ 1.
(27)
We observe that A|AC “ 1 because PpA|ACq “ 1. The possible values of A|AC, A|pC|Aq, and
A|pAC _ sAq are given in Table 3.
The next result shows that PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq, when PpC|Aq ą 0.
Theorem 7. Let A and C be two events with AC ‰ H. If PpC|Aq ą 0, then PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq.
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Ch A|pAC _ sAq A|pC|Aq A|AC
x “ 1 0 ă x ă 1 x “ 0
AC 1 1 1 1 1sA 0 0 µp1´ xq µ 1
A sC ν µ µ µ 1
Table 3: Possible values of A|pAC _ sAq, A|pC|Aq, and A|AC relative to the constituents Ch. Here, x “ PpC|Aq,
ν “ PrA|pAC _ sAqs, and µ “ PrA|pC|Aqs. The iterated conditional A|pC|Aq coincides with A|AC “ 1 when x “ 0,
and it coincides with A|pAC _ sAq when x “ 1.
Proof. By applying equation (9), with pB|Kq|pA|Hq “ A|pC|Aq, it holds that
PrA ^ pC|Aqs “ PrA|pC|AqsPpC|Aq. (28)
Moreover, A ^ pC|Aq “ AC and hence
PrA ^ pC|Aqs “ PpACq “ PpAqPpC|Aq. (29)
Thus, from (28) and (29), it follows that
PrA|pC|AqsPpC|Aq “ PpAqPpC|Aq, (30)
from which it follows PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq, when PpC|Aq ą 0.
Notice that the two objects A|pC|Aq and A are generally not equivalent (even if PrA|pC|Aqs “
PpAq when PpC|Aq ą 0)4. Indeed, A is an event, while as shown in (27) the iterated conditional
A|pC|Aq is in general a conditional random quantity. We also observe that, when PpC|Aq “ 0,
formula (30) becomes 0 “ 0, but in general PrA|pC|Aqs ‰ PpAq because from (27) one has
PrA|pC|Aqs “ 1 and usually PpAq ă 1. Thus, when PpC|Aq “ 0, the equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq
holds only if PpAq “ 1. We also observe that the assessment py, µq on tA, A|pC|Aqu is coherent for
every py, µq P r0, 1s2, while y “ µ under the constraint PpC|Aq ą 0.
Remark 8. The equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq, when PpC|Aq ą 0, appears natural in many ex-
amples. Recall, for instance, the experiment where a ball is drawn from an urn of unknown
composition. If we consider the events A “ “the urn contains 9 white balls and 1 black ball”,
C “ “the (drawn) ball is white”, normally we evaluate PpC|Aq “ 0.9. Moreover, the degree of
belief in the hypothesis A seems to be completely “uncorrelated” with the conditional if A then C.
Then, the equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq is reasonable, whatever value we specify for PpAq. The
same happens if, for instance, A “ “the urn contains 2 white balls and 8 black balls”, in which
case PpC|Aq “ 0.2. We notice that on the one hand, even if the equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq may
appear sometimes counterintuitive, it is a result of our theory, where the new objects of conjoined
4Under the material conditional interpretation, where the conditional if© then l is looked at as the event s©_l,
the iterated conditional if (if A then C) then A coincides with A. Indeed, in this case, the iterated conditional if (if A
then C) then A would coincide with psA _Cq _ A “ A sC _ A “ A.
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and iterated conditionals are introduced. On the other hand, we do not see any motivations why
the conditional if A then C should modify the degree of belief in A. We will examine later (see
Section 5 and Section 7) some examples, where A|pC|Aq is replaced by a suitable generalized
iterated conditional (which makes explicit some latent information); then, as a consequence, the
previous equality will be replaced by an inequality. For instance, in Section 5, the latent infor-
mation will be made explicit by replacing A|pC|Aq by A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq; then, it will be shown that
PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs ě PpAq.
4.2. Some relations among A|AC, A|pC|Aq, and A|pAC _ sAq
In this subsection we examine an order relation among A|AC, A|pC|Aq and A|pAC _ sAq.
Theorem 8. Let A and C be two events, with AC ‰ H. Then, the following order relation holds
A|pAC _ sAq ď A|pC|Aq ď A|AC “ 1. (31)
Proof. We set PpC|Aq “ x, PpA|pAC_ sAqq “ ν, and PpA|pC|Aqq “ µ. We distinguish three cases:
piq x “ 0; piiq 0 ă x ă 1; piiiq x “ 1.
Case piq. As x “ 0, from (27) A|pC|Aq “ A|AC “ 1. Then, the inequalities in (31) are satisfied.
Case piiq. As 0 ă x ă 1, from (27) it holds that A|pC|Aq “ rAC` µp1´ xqsAs|pAC _ sAq. Then, by
observing that A|pAC _ sAq “ AC|pAC _ sAq and that µp1´ xqsA ě 0, it follows
A|pC|Aq ´ A|pAC _ sAq “ rAC ` µp1 ´ xqsAs|pAC _ sAq ´ AC|pAC _ sAq “
“ rAC ` µp1 ´ xqsA ´ ACs|pAC _ sAq “ rµp1´ xqsAs|pAC _ sAq ě 0. (32)
Then, the inequalities in (31) are satisfied.
Case piiiq. As x “ 1, from (27) it holds that A|pC|Aq “ A|pAC _ sAq. Then, the inequalities in (31)
are satisfied.
We remark that from (31) it follows that
PrA|pAC _ sAqs ď PrA|pC|Aqs ď PpA|ACq “ 1. (33)
Remark 9. We recall that AC ď C|A ď AC _ sA. Then, symmetrically (see Theorem 8), it holds
that
A|AC ě A|pC|Aq ě A|pAC _ sAq.
In other words, the iterated conditional A|pC|Aq is an intermediate object between A|AC (which is
obtained when in the iterated conditional we replace the antecedent C|A by AC) and A|pAC _ sAq
(which is obtained when we replace C|A by the associated material conditional AC _ sA).
In the next result we illustrate the relation among PpC|Aq, PrA|pAC _ sAqs, and PrA|pC|Aqs.
Theorem 9. Let A and C be two events, with AC ‰ H. We set PpC|Aq “ x, PrA|pAC _ sAqs “ ν,
and PrA|pC|Aqs “ µ. Then,
µ “ ν` µp1´ xqp1´ νq. (34)
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Proof. We distinguish three cases: piq x “ 0; piiq 0 ă x ă 1; piiiq x “ 1.
Case piq. As x “ 0, formula (34) becomes µ “ ν` µp1´ νq, which is satisfied because from (27)
A|pC|Aq “ A|AC “ 1 and hence µ “ 1.
Case piiq. As 0 ă x ă 1, from (27) it holds that A|pC|Aq “ rAC ` µp1´ xqsAs|pAC _ sAq. Then, as
AC|pAC _ sAq “ A|pAC _ sAq, it follows that
A|pC|Aq “ rAC ` µp1´ xqsAs|pAC _ sAq “ A|pAC _ sAq ` µp1 ´ xqsA|pAC _ sAq. (35)
Then,
µ “ PrA|pC|Aqs “ PrA|pAC _ sAqs ` µp1´ xqPrsA|pAC _ sAqs “ ν ` µp1´ xqp1´ νq,
that is (34).
Case piiiq. As x “ 1, formula (34) becomes µ “ ν, which is satisfied because from (27) A|pC|Aq “
A|pAC _ sAq.
Remark 10. By exploiting (34), we can illustrate another way to establish the result of Theorem
7, that is PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq, when PpC|Aq ą 0. Indeed, (as PpC|Aq “ x ą 0) from (34) we
obtain µ “ ν
ν`x´xν
. Moreover, by setting PpAq “ y, it holds that
ν “ PpA|pAC _ sAq “ PpC|AqPpAq
PpC|AqPpAq ` PpsAq “ xyxy ` 1´ y .
Then,
µ “
xy
xy`1´y
xy
xy`1´y
` x ´ x xy
xy`1´y
“
xy
xy ` x2y` x ´ xy ´ x2y
“
xy
x
“ y,
that is: PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq.
4.3. Further results related to the equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq
We now illustrate some formulas which are obtained from the equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq by
replacing some events by their negation.
Remark 11. Based on Theorem 7, by replacing the event C by sC or A by sA it holds that
1. PrA|p sC|Aqs “ PpAq, if Pp sC|Aq ą 0 (where A sC ‰ H);
2. PrsA|pC|sAqs “ PpsAq, if PpC|sAq ą 0 (where sAC ‰ H);
3. PrsA|p sC|sAqs “ PpsAq, if Pp sC|sAq ą 0 (where sA sC ‰ H).
We give below a further result where the consequent A in the iterated conditional A|pC|Aq is
replaced by sA.
Theorem 10. Let two events A and C be given, with AC ‰ H. Then, PrsA|pC|Aqs “ PpsAq, if
PpC|Aq ą 0.
Proof. By Theorem 6, sA|pC|Aq “ 1 ´ A|pC|Aq. Hence, PrsA|pC|Aqs “ 1 ´ PrA|pC|Aqs. If
PpC|Aq ą 0, by Theorem 7, PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq. Therefore, PrsA|pC|Aqs “ 1´PpAq “ PpsAq.
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Remark 12. Based on the proof of Theorem 10, and by Remark 11, we obtain similar formulas
by replacing the consequent A by sA (and hence sA by A):
1. PrsA|p sC|Aqs “ PpsAq, if Pp sC|Aq ą 0 (where A sC ‰ H);
2. PrA|pC|sAqs “ PpAq, if PpC|sAq ą 0 (where sAC ‰ H);
3. PrA|p sC|sAqs “ PpAq, if Pp sC|sAq ą 0 (where sA sC ‰ H).
4.4. On the Sue example
We will now consider the Sue example, where the events A and C are defined as follows:
A “Sue passes the exam, C “Sue goes on a skiing holiday, C|A “If Sue passes the exam, then
she goes on a skiing holiday. We recall that, by Corollary 1, when PpC|Aq “ 0 it holds that
A|pC|Aq “ A|AC “ 1 and hence
PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpA|ACq “ 1 ě PpAq,
with PrA|pC|Aqs ą PpAq when PpAq ă 1. On the contrary, when PpC|Aq ą 0, by Theorem 7
it follows that PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq, i.e., the degree of belief in Sue passes the exam, given that
if Sue passes the exam, then she goes on a skiing holiday coincides with the probability that Sue
passes the exam. The equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq, in the Sue example, may seem counterintuitive
(see the criticism in [28]); but, in our opinion this happens because some latent information is not
considered. In what follows we will examine further iterated conditionals, where the antecedent
pC|Aq is replaced by a suitable conjunction containing the additional information that was latent
in the context of the Sue example. The new antecedent, with the extra information, explains the
intuition that the degree of belief in A (given the new antecedent) should increase. A first relevant
case is obtained if we replace the antecedent C|A by pC|Aq ^ C, that is if we consider the iterated
conditional (Sue passes the exam), given that (if Sue passes the exam, then she goes on a skiing
holiday) and (she goes on a skiing holiday). In other words we consider the generalized iterated
conditional A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq, which is examined in the next section.
5. The generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq
In this section we consider the generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq ^Cq. The next result
shows that PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs ě PpAq.
Theorem 11. Given two events A and C, with AC ‰ H, it holds that PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs ě PpAq.
Proof. We set x “ PpC|Aq and µ “ PrA|ppC|Aq ^Cqs. As A ^ pC|Aq ^C “ AC, from Definition
6 it holds that
A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq “ A ^ pC|Aq ^ C ` µp1´ pC|Aq ^ Cq “
“ AC ` µp1´ pC|Aq ^ Cq “
$&
%
1, if AC is true,
µp1´ xq, if sAC is true,
µ, if sC is true.
(36)
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Then, by the linearity of prevision, it follows that µPrppC|Aq ^ Cqs “ PpACq. We observe that
pC|Aq ^ C “
$&
%
1, if AC is true,
x, if sAC is true,
0, if sC is true,
that is, pC|Aq ^ C “ AC ` xsAC. Then,
PrpC|Aq ^ Cs “ PpACq ` PpC|AqPpsACq “ PpC|AqpPpAq ` PpsACqq “ PpC|AqPpA _ Cq,
with
PrpC|Aq ^ Cs ą 0ðñ PpC|Aq ą 0 and PpA _ Cq ą 0.
If PrpC|Aq ^ Cs ą 0, then
µ “ PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs “
PpACq
PrpC|Aq ^ Cs
“
PpACq
PpC|AqPpA _ Cq
“
PpAq
PpA _ Cq
“ PpA|pA_Cqq ě PpAq,
(37)
because PpA _ Cq ď 1. Equivalently, the inequality in (37) also follows because A Ď A|pA _ Cq.
If PrpC|Aq ^ Cs “ 0 we distinguish two cases: piq PpC|Aq “ 0; piiqPpA _ Cq “ 0.
In case piq, from (36) we obtain
A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq “
"
1, if AC is true,
µ, if sA _ sC is true. (38)
Then, by coherence, µ “ 1 and A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq “ A|AC “ 1. Thus µ “ 1 ě PpAq.
In case piiq it holds that PpAq “ 0 and hence µ ě PpAq.
In conclusion, PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs ě PpAq.
Remark 13. We observe that usually the inequality PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs ě PpAq is strict, with the
equality satisfied only in extreme cases. Indeed, as shown in the proof of Theorem 11, when
PrpC|Aq ^ Cs ą 0, we obtain that PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs “ PpAq only if PpA _ Cq “ 1, or PpAq “ 0.
When PrpC|Aq ^ Cs “ 0, we obtain that PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs “ PpAq only if PpC|Aq “ 0 and
PpAq “ 1, or PpA _ Cq “ 0 and PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs “ 0.
Theorem 11 can be used to explicate the intuition in the example of Sue ([28]), discussed in
Section 4.4. The original intuition was that learning the conditional if A then C should increase
your degree of belief in A. However, in this example, we learn if A then C and we have the latent
information C; then, we believe both the conditional if A then C and the event C. Theorem 11
shows that having these two beliefs can increase our belief in A. In formal terms, if we replace the
antecedent C|A by pC|Aq ^ C, we reach the conclusion that the degree of belief in A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq
is greater than or equal to PpAq. Such reasoning can be seen as a form of an abductive inference
(see, e.g., [27]) and it is also an instance of Affirmation of the Consequent (AC): from if A then
C and C infer A. This argument form is not logically valid. In probability logic, however, it is
probabilistically informative and not p-valid (see Section 6).
The next result is similar to Theorem 11, with PpAq replaced by PpA|Cq.
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Theorem 12. Given two events A and C, with AC ‰ H, it holds that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs ě PpA|Cq.
Proof. We distinguish three cases: piq PpC|AqPpA _ Cq ą 0; piiq PpC|Aq “ 0; piiiq PpC|Aq ą 0
and PpA _ Cq “ 0.
In case piq, as shown in the proof of Theorem 11, it holds that PrA|ppC|Aq^Cqs “ PpA|pA_Cqq ě
PpA|Cq, because A|C Ď A|pA _ Cq.
In case piiq, as shown in the proof of Theorem 11, it holds that A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq “ A|AC “ 1 and
hence PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs “ 1 ě PpA|Cq.
In case piiiq, as we obtain:
A|C “
$&
%
1, if AC is true,
0, if sAC is true,
η, if sC is true, and A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq “
$&
%
1, if AC is true,
µp1´ xq, if sAC is true,
µ, if sC is true,
where x “ PpC|Aq ą 0. Then, A|C ď A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq when C is true and by (Theorem 2 and)
Remark 2 it follows that PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqs ě PpA|Cq.
As shown by Theorem 12, in the Sue example the probability of the conditional A|C, that is
(Sue passes the exam), given that (Sue goes on a skiing holiday), can increase if we replace the
antecedent C by pC|Aq ^ C, that is if we replace (Sue goes on a skiing holiday) by (if Sue passes
the exam, then she goes on a skiing holiday) and (Sue goes on a skiing holiday).
Remark 14. We observe that, in the particular case where PpC|Aq “ 1, it holds that
A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq “
$&
%
1, if AC is true,
0, if sAC is true,
µ, if sC is true.
Then, A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq coincides with A|C, when C is true and, by Theorem 2, it follows that
PpA|ppC|Aq ^ Cqq “ PpA|Cq and A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq “ A|C.
6. Lower and Upper Bounds on Affirmation of the Consequent
In the previous section we considered an instance of AC in Theorem 11 and the Sue example.
In this section we will give a general probabilistic analysis of AC as an inference rule, where the
premise set is tC,C|Au and the conclusion is A. We recall that a family of conditional events
F “ tEi|Hi , i “ 1, . . . , nu is p-consistent if and only if the assessment p1, 1, . . . , 1q on F is
coherent. In addition, a p-consistent family F p-entails a conditional event E|H if and only if
the unique coherent extension on E|H of the assessment p1, 1, . . . , 1q on F is PpE|Hq “ 1 (see,
e.g., [46]). We say that the inference from F to E|H is p-valid if and only if F p-entails E|H.
The characterization of the p-entailment using the notions of conjunction and generalized iterated
conditional has been given in [42, 51]. We will show that the inference AC is not p-valid, that is
from PpCq “ PpC|Aq “ 1 it does not follow that PpAq “ 1. Notice that this inference rule has been
also examined in [77]. Here we examine the inference rule without assuming that 0 ă PpC|Aq ă 1.
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Theorem 13. Let two logically independent events A and C and any coherent probability assess-
ment px, yq on tC,C|Au be given. The extension z “ PpAq is coherent if and only if z1 ď z ď z2,
where
z1 “ 0, z2 “
$’&
’%
1, if x “ y,
x
y
, if x ă y,
1´x
1´y
, if x ą y.
(39)
Proof. The constituents are AC, A sC, sAC, sA sC; the associated points for the family tC,C|A, Au are
Q1 “ p1, 1, 1q, Q2 “ p0, 0, 1q, Q3 “ p1, y, 0q, Q4 “ p0, y, 0q. We denote by I the convex hull
of Q1, . . . , Q4. We observe that: the assessment px, yq on tC,C|Au is coherent, for every px, yq P
r0, 1s2; the assessment px, zq on tC, Au is coherent, for every px, zq P r0, 1s2; the assessment py, zq
on tC|A, Au is coherent, for every py, zq P r0, 1s2. Then, the coherence of px, y, zq is equivalent to
the condition px, y, zq P I, that is to the solvability of the system$’’’&
’’’’%
λ1 ` λ3 “ x,
λ1 ` yλ3 ` yλ4 “ y,
λ1 ` λ2 “ z,
λ1 ` λ2 ` λ3 ` λ4 “ 1,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 4 ,
that is
$’’’&
’’’’%
λ1 “ yz,
λ2 “ z ´ yz,
λ3 “ x ´ yz,
λ4 “ 1´ x ´ z ` yz,
λi ě 0, i “ 1, . . . , 4 .
(40)
We observe that the system p40q with z “ 0 is solvable for every px, yq P r0, 1s2. Then, z1 “ 0 for
every px, yq P r0, 1s2. Concerning the upper bound z2 we distinguish three cases: piq x “ y; piiq
x ă y; piiiq x ą y.
Case piq. Given any px, yq, with x “ y P r0, 1s, the system p40q is solvable with z “ 1. Then
z2 “ 1, when x “ y.
Case piiq. Given any px, yq P r0, 1s2, with x ă y, the system p40q is solvable if and only if
0 ď z ď x
y
. Then z2 “ x
y
, when x ă y.
Case piiiq. Given any px, yq P r0, 1s2, with x ą y, the system p40q is solvable if and only if
0 ď z ď 1´x
1´y
. Then z2 “ 1´x
1´y
, when x ą y.
As shown by Theorem 13, the inference AC is not p-valid. Indeed, the assessment p1, 1, zq on
tC,C|A, Au is coherent for every z P r0, 1s. In [42] it has been shown that
PpCq “ 1, PpC|Aq “ 1, PpC|sAq ă 1 ùñ PpAq “ 1.
Thus, under the probabilistic constraint PpC|sAq ă 1, we obtain a (weak) p-valid AC rule.
7. Further generalized iterated conditionals
In this section we will examine some further cases, in the Sue example, where the degree of
belief in A increases if we consider suitable antecedents in the generalized iterated conditionals.
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7.1. Analysis of A|ppC|Aq ^ Kq
We consider the case where the latent information is represented by the event K “ Sue in-
creases her study time. As it seems reasonable, we assume that the following inequalities hold:
piq PpA|Kq ě PpAq; piiq PpC|AKq ě PpC|Aq; piiiq PrpC|Aq ^ Ks ą 0. (41)
Then, in order to take into account the latent information K, we study the generalized iterated
conditional A|ppC|Aq ^ Kqq. From Definition 3 it holds that A ^ pC|Aq “ AC and hence
A ^ pC|Aq ^ K “ ACK. (42)
We observe that pC|Aq ^ K ^ A is equal to pC|Aq ^ K, or 0, according to whether A is true, or
false. Likewise, pC|Aq ^ K ^ sA is equal to pC|Aq ^ K, or 0, according to whether sA is true, or
false. Therefore pC|Aq ^ K “ pC|Aq ^ K ^ A ` pC|Aq ^ K ^ sA and hence, from (42)
pC|Aq ^ K “ ACK ` pC|Aq ^ K ^ sA. (43)
In addition, PrpC|Aq|sAKs “ PpC|Aq because A and sAK are incompatible (see [87, formula (24)])
and from (14) it follows that
PrpC|Aq ^ K ^ sAs “ PrpC|Aq|sAKsPpsAKq “ PpC|AqPpsAKq. (44)
We observe that PrpC|Aq ^ Ks ą 0 implies PpKq ą 0 and PpC|Aq ą 0. Then, from (14), (42),
(43), and (44), we obtain
PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Kqs “ PrA^pC|Aq^Ks
PrpC|Aq^Ks
“ PpACKq
PpACKq`PrpC|Aq^K^sAs “ PpACKqPpACKq`PpC|AqPpsAKq “
“ PpAC|Kq
PpAC|Kq`PpC|AqPpsA|Kq “ PpA|Kq PpC|AKqPpAC|Kq`PpC|AqPpsA|Kq “ PpA|Kq PpC|AKqPpC|AKqPpA|Kq`PpC|AqPpsA|Kq .
(45)
As PpC|AKq ě PpC|Aq ą 0, it follows
PpC|AKq “ PpC|AKqPpA|Kq ` PpC|AKqPpsA|Kq ě PpC|AKqPpA|Kq ` PpC|AqPpsA|Kq ą 0,
and hence
PpC|AKq
PpC|AKqPpA|Kq ` PpC|AqPpsA|Kq ě 1.
Therefore, as PpA|Kq ě PpAq, it holds that
PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Kqs “ PpA|Kq
PpC|AKq
PpC|AKqPpA|Kq`PpC|AqPpsA|Kq ě PpA|Kq ě PpAq. (46)
In summary, if the latent information is represented by the event K and we assume the inequalities
in (41), then the degree of belief in A increases, that is PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Kqs ě PpAq.
Remark 15. If we consider the event H=Harry sees Sue buying some skiing equipment, then
(likewise (41)) it is reasonable to evaluate PpA|Hq ě PpAq, PpC|AHq ě PpC|Aq, and PrpC|Aq ^
Hs ą 0. Then, by the same reasoning, we reach the conclusion that PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Hqs ě PpAq.
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7.2. Analysis of the new object A|rpC|Aq ^ pK|pC|Aqqs
It could seem that the reasoning in Section 7.1 should be developed by replacing in A|rpC|Aq^
Ks the event K by the iterated conditional K|pC|Aq, which formalizes the sentence if Sue goes to
holiday when she passes the exam, then she increases her study time. If we replace K by K|pC|Aq,
the iterated conditional A|rpC|Aq ^ Ks becomes the new object A|rpC|Aq ^ pK|pC|Aqqs which we
need to examine. We start our analysis by defining the conjunction between a conditional event
and an iterated conditional.
Definition 7. Let a conditional event C|F and an iterated conditional pB|Kq|pA|Hq be given, with
PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs “ ν. We define
pC|Fq^rpB|Kq|pA|Hqs “ rpB|Kq|pA|Hqs^pC|Fq “ pA|Hq^pB|Kq^pC|Fq`ν rpsA|Hq^pC|Fqs.
(47)
We observe that, as pB|Kq|pA|Hq “ pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq ` ν sA|H, formula (47) implicitly assumes
a suitable distributive property. Indeed
pC|Fq ^ rpB|Kq|pA|Hqs “ pC|Fq ^ rpA|Hq ^ pB|Kq ` ν sA|Hs “
“ pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq ^ pC|Fq ` ν rpsA|Hq ^ pC|Fqs,
and as we can see the equality
pC|Fq ^ rpA|Hq ^ pB|Kq ` ν sA|Hs “ pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq ^ pC|Fq ` ν rpsA|Hq ^ pC|Fqs (48)
represents a kind of distributive property of the conjunction over the sum. This property has been
already introduced in [52].
Remark 16. Notice that, by applying Definition 7 with C|F “ A|H, as psA|Hq ^ pA|Hq “ 0 it
follows that
rpB|Kq|pA|Hqs ^ pA|Hq “ pA|Hq ^ pB|Kq, (49)
which has the same structure of the equality pB|Aq ^ A “ AB. Moreover, by recalling (9), it holds
that
PrppB|Kq|pA|Hqq ^ pA|Hqs “ PrpB|Kq|pA|HqsPpA|Hq. (50)
Concerning the antecedent pC|Aq ^ pK|pC|Aqq of the new object studied in this section,
A|rpC|Aq ^ pK|pC|Aqqs, as K|Ω “ K from (49) it follows that
pC|Aq ^ rK|pC|Aqs “ pC|Aq ^ rpK|Ωq|pC|Aqs “ pC|Aq ^ K. (51)
Thus
A|rpC|Aq ^ pK|pC|Aqqs “ A|rpC|Aq ^ Ks, (52)
that is the new object A|rpC|Aq ^ pK|pC|Aqqs coincides with the generalized iterated conditional
A|rpC|Aq ^ Ks. Finally, for the degree of belief in A|rpC|Aq ^ pK|pC|Aqqs we reach the same
conclusions given for A|rpC|Aq ^ Ks in Section 7.1.
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7.3. The generalized iterated conditional A|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq
In this section we consider the generalized iterated conditional where in the antecedent we add
the conditional A|H. Here, H is a further event. Of course, when H “ Ω it holds that
A|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq “ A|ppC|Aq ^ Aq “ A|AC “ 1 ě A.
Hence, PrA|ppC|Aq ^ Aqs “ 1 ě PpAq. We show below that, given any event H ‰ Ω, we obtain
the weaker result that PrA|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqqs “ PpA _ Hq ě PpAq.
Theorem 14. Let A,C, H be three logically independent events, with PpACHq ą 0. Then,
PrA|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqqs “ PpA _ Hq.
Proof. We set x “ PpC|Aq, y “ PpA|Hq, z “ PrpC|Aq ^ pA|Hqs, µ “ PrA|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqqs. We
observe that
pC|Aq ^ pA|Hq “
$’&
’’%
1, if ACH is true,
y, if AC sH is true,
0, if A sC _ sAH is true,
z, if sA sH is true.
(53)
Thus, as PpACHq ą 0, it holds that ACH ‰ H and hence pC|Aq ^ pA|Hq ‰ 0, so that A|ppC|Aq ^
pA|Hqq makes sense. We also observe that PpACHq ą 0 implies PpA _ Hq ą 0; then
z “ PrpC|Aq ^ pA|Hqs “
PpACHq ` yPpAC sHq
PpA _ Hq
ą 0. (54)
Moreover,
A|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq “ AC ^ pA|Hq ` µp1 ´ pC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq “
“
$’’&
’’%
1, if ACH is true,
y` µp1´ yq, if AC sH is true,
µp1´ zq, if sA sH is true,
µ, if A sC _ sAH is true.
From (14) and (54) it holds that
µ “ PrA|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqqs “
PrA ^ pC|Aq ^ pA|Hqs
PrpC|Aq ^ pA|Hqs
“
PrAC ^ pA|Hqs
PrpC|Aq ^ pA|Hqs
.
We observe that
pACq ^ pA|Hq “
$&
%
1, if ACH is true,
y, if AC sH is true,
0, if sA _ sC is true;
then
PrAC ^ pA|Hqs “ PpACHq ` yPpAC sHq. (55)
Notice that (55) also follows by applying the distributive property; indeed
AC ^ pA|Hq “ AC ^ pAH ` y sHq “ ACH ` yAC sH,
27
and hence (55) follows by the linearity of prevision. Finally,
µ “
PrAC ^ pA|Hqs
PrpC|Aq ^ pA|Hqs
“
PpACHq ` yPpAC sHq
PpACHq`yPpAC sHq
PpA_Hq
“ PpA _ Hq.
Thus, under the assumption that PpACHq ą 0, by Theorem 14 it holds that
PrA|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqqs “ PpA _ Hq ě PpAq. (56)
Remark 17. If in A|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq we exchange the antecedent with the consequent, we obtain
the generalized iterated conditional
ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq|A “ AC ^ pA|Hq ` ηp1´ Aq “
$’’&
’%
1, if ACH is true,
y, if AC sH is true,
0, if A sC is true,
η, if sA is true,
(57)
where η “ PrppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq|As. Notice that:
paq the conjunction pC|Aq^pA|Hq is a conditional random quantity with conditioning event A_H,
that is pC|Aq ^ pA|Hq “ X|pA _ Hq “ pACH ` yAC sHq|pA _ Hq (see formula (53));
pbq as A Ď A _ H, it holds that (see Remark 6)
ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq|A “ pX|pA _ Hqq|A “ X|A “ pACH ` yAC sHq|A “ pCH ` yC sHq|A;
that is the generalized iterated conditional ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq|A is a conditional random quantity
with the conditioning event A;
pcq from (53) and (57) it holds that ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq|A ě pC|Aq ^ pA|Hq, when A _ H is true.
Thus, by Remark 2 (and Theorem 2), it follows that
piqPrppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq|As ě PrpC|Aq ^ pA|Hqs; piiq ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq|A ě pC|Aq ^ pA|Hq. (58)
Then, (under the assumption that PpACHq ą 0) the inequality PrA|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqqs ě PpAq in
(56) also follows by the following reasoning:
PrA|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqqs “
PrAC^pA|Hqs
PrpC|Aq^pA|Hqs
“
PrA^pC|Aq^pA|Hqs
PrpC|Aq^pA|Hqs
“ PpAq
PrpC|Aq^pA|Hq|As
PrpC|Aq^pA|Hqs
ě PpAq. (59)
Notice that the inequalityPrA|ppC|Aq^pA|Hqqs ě PpAq is valid for every event H; for instance,
in the Sue example it is not necessary that H is the event Harry sees Sue buying some skiing
equipment. Indeed, the strong motivation for the inequality PrA|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqqs ě PpAq in (59)
is given by (58).
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8. Independence and uncorrelation
In this section we give further comments on the notions of independence and uncorrelation.
As a first example, we recall that PrpC|Aq ^ As “ PpC|AqPpAq (see formula (29)). This result
is rejected by some researchers, because it is supposed to be “deeply problematic”([28], see also
[29]) for A and C|A to be “independent”. But, we observe that for discussing independence in
the context of iterated conditionals a definition of independence should be given first. We also
observe that in our approach conditional events and conjunctions are conditional random quan-
tities. In addition, concerning the notions of independence and uncorrelation, we recall that two
random quantities X and Y are uncorrelated if PpXYq “ PpXqPpYq. While, X, Y are stochastically
independent when PpX “ x ^ Y “ yq “ PpX “ xqPpY “ yq for every pair px, yq. As it is well
known, if X, Y are independent, then X, Y are uncorrelated; the converse is in general not valid. As
independence implies uncorrelation, there are three cases: X, Y are uncorrelated and independent;
X, Y are uncorrelated but not independent; X, Y are not uncorrelated and not independent.
A case where X, Y are uncorrelated but not independent is the following one. If Y “ X2 and
X P t´1, 0, 1u, with PpX “ 1q “ PpX “ ´1q “ PpX “ 0q “ 1{3, then Y P t0, 1u with
PpY “ 1q “ 2{3 and PpY “ 0q “ 1{3. In this case PpXq “ 0, PpYq “ 2{3 and PpXqPpYq “ 0.
Moreover, XY “ X3 “ X, then PpXYq “ 0 “ PpXqPpYq. However, X, Y are not independent
because, for instance, PpX “ 1 ^ Y “ 1q “ PpX “ 1q “ 1{3, while PpX “ 1qPpY “ 1q “ 2{9,
so that PpX “ 1^ Y “ 1q ‰ PpX “ 1qPpY “ 1q.
From this point of view, the equality PppC|Aq ^ Aq “ PpC|AqPpAq represents the property of
uncorrelation between the random quantities C|A and A. Indeed, we observe that pC|Aq ^ A “
pC|Aq ¨ A in all cases and hence PrpC|Aq ^ As “ PpC|AqPpAq “ PrpC|Aq ¨ As. Therefore, in our
framework, we could look at C|A and A as uncorrelated random quantities. However, C|A and
A cannot be seen as two stochastically independent random quantities because, for instance, by
assuming PpC|Aq “ PpAq “ 1
2
, it holds that
PppA “ 1q^ppC|Aq “ 1qq “ PpAC “ 1q “ PpACq “
1
4
‰ PpA “ 1qPppC|Aq “ 1q “ PpAqPpACq “
1
8
.
As a further example, let us consider two conditional events A|H and B|K, with HK “ H. We
recall that (see [45, Section 5])
PrpA|Hq ^ pB|Kqs “ PrpA|Hq ¨ pB|Kqs “ PpA|HqPpB|Kq.
Then, as already observed in [45], when HK “ H the conditional events A|H and B|K should
be looked at as uncorrelated random quantities. However, when HK “ H, (the two random
quantities) A|H and B|K are (in general) not independent. Indeed, by setting PpA|Hq “ x P
p0, 1q, PpB|Kq “ y P p0, 1q, it holds that A|H P t1, 0, xu, B|K P t1, 0, yu, pA|H, B|Kq P
tp1, yq, p0, yq, px, 1q, px, 0q, px, yqu, and pA|Hq ¨ pB|Kq P t0, x, y, xyu. Then A|H and B|K are not
independent because, by assuming for instance that PpAHq ą 0 and PpsKq ă 1, one has
PrppA|Hq “ 1q^pB|Kq “ ys “ PpAH sKq “ PpAHq ‰ PpAHqPpsKq “ PrpA|Hq “ 1sPrpB|Kq “ ys.
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9. Conclusions
In this paper, we examined Lewis’s triviality proof, for what it could tell us about condition-
als and iterations of them, and we studied the prevision of several iterated conditionals in the
framework of coherence and conditional random quantities. We analyzed the antecedent-nested
conditional D|pC|Aq and its negation sD|pC|Aq, by verifying that the import-export principle does
not hold. In particular, we showed that PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq and PrsA|pC|Aqs “ PpsAq, when
PpC|Aq ą 0. We also proved the ordering A|AC ď A|pC|Aq ď A|pAC _ sAq.
Then, we examined the Sue example where the equality PrA|pC|Aqs “ PpAq appears coun-
terintuitive. To support the intuition that the degree of belief in A should increase, we introduced
and studied the following (generalized) iterated conditionals: A|ppC|Aq ^ Cq, A|ppC|Aq ^ Kq,
A|ppC|Aq ^ pK|pC|Aqqq, and A|ppC|Aq ^ pA|Hqq. In these (generalized) iterated conditionals the
respective antecedents are strengthened by additional information. This additional information
can be seen as explicated latent information, which may derive from background knowledge or
from conversational implicatures. We verified that for all these iterated conditionals, with suitably
“strengthened” antecedents, the prevision is greater than or equal to the probability of the conse-
quent A. Thus these iterated conditionals seem valid formalizations of different types of additional
information in the antecedent, for which it holds that the degree of belief in A increases.
Our examination of the Sue example illustrates for us a general point about the analysis of
intuitions in philosophical thought experiments. If our intuitions are in conflict with the results of
the available formal methods, it could be that piq the analysis requires a richer formal structure, or
piiq implicit information in the thought experiment has to be made explicit for a correct analysis.
The formal understanding of the Sue example requires both, a richer formal structure and the
explication of implicit information.
We also deepened the study of the probabilistic propagation from the premises to the conclu-
sion for the Affirmation of the Consequent, which is an abductive inference form. Finally, we
considered the equalities PrpC|Aq ^ As “ PpC|AqPpAq and PrpA|Hq ^ pB|Kqs “ PpA|HqPpB|Kq
when HK “ H. Some authors see these equalities as cases of probabilistic independence, but we
argued that such equalities are correctly interpreted (only) as instances of uncorrelation between
two random quantities.
Lewis ([65]) was aware that, to retain the attractive qualities of the CPH and yet to avoid
triviality, an approach something like ours would have to be developed. But he did not want
himself to go down this line, because it would mean “. . . too much of a fresh start . . .” and would
burden “. . . us with too much work to be done . . .”. He specifically pointed to compounds and
iterations of conditionals as serious problems for this fresh work. But we have done that work in
this paper, proving that our approach implies the CPH as a natural consequence, avoids triviality,
and leads to an account of compounds and iterations of conditionals.
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